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"Belief" and "Faith"
When I use the word "faith," I have in mind unjustified belief, or belief insufficiently justified by evidence or
argumentation to rationally induce belief. Simply, faith is belief without good reason. When I use the word "faith,"
I do not have in mind the psychological sense of certitude--I do not have in mind the force of conviction--although the
unjustified belief constituting faith does seem curiously correlated with certitude. (One might think that the lack of
good reason would engender stronger doubt than usual, but it doesn't seem to work that way.) For
philosophical purposes, it is the lack of justification that is the important feature of faith. Someone might say that his
faith is a motivating force for him, or that he puts his faith into practice; however, it is the epistemological feature of
faith--namely, its lacking sufficient justification to compel rational belief--that I am concerned with.
When I speak of "belief," I have in mind the attitude which the believer adopts toward an idea when he
consciously agrees with it--when he thinks it is true or correct (with or without good reason), or when his opinion
of the likelihood of its truth or correctness is such that he would agree with it; it is the attitude of acceptance that a fact
is so or that a proposition is true.
A believer of an idea or of the truth of a statement, were he to be asked about it, would assert or agree with the
sentence expressing the idea he believed; he would assert or agree with the statement whose truth he believed. If a
person believed that tigers were striped, he would mentally agree that tigers were striped, and were he asked, "Are
tigers striped," he would answer, "Yes, they are" (or something to the same effect). His affirmative reply would give
evidence of his mental state--of his attitude--of belief that tigers are striped, and the fact that he would give an
affirmative reply if asked would reflect his state of belief. This is the intentional attitude that typically accompanies
thinking that a purported fact is actually so or that its corresponding proposition is true.
(Of course, someone might not understand a question put to him, or he might lie about his mental state, or he might be
physically unable to reply, or he might mistakenly misstate his mental state. In order to avoid repeatedly having to
stipulate that none of those applies, let us assume that all hearers of
questions understand the questions put to them, and that all speakers intend to tell the truth, and that all speakers are
physically able to make the replies they intend to make and never find themselves making unintended replies. In
other words, let us assume language comprehension sufficient to the relevant tasks, and let us assume that speakers
always speak truthfully and always say what they intend to say, so that reports of belief accurately reflect belief. It is,
after all, the mental state that constitutes belief.)
There are a few distinctions that can be made here. First, note that belief is almost always belief of likelihood; almost
always, one must acknowledge the possibility that he is mistaken. Second--and this follows from the first--while
belief does not come in degrees, we may meaningfully speak of strength of belief, depending on how likely one thinks
a belief is to be true. Moreover, third, we may speak of one's psychological force of belief--the force with which he
believes; the degree of his conviction; his feeling of surety or certitude--which probably ought to but also probably does
not always align with his strength of belief (i.e., with the greatness of his estimate of likelihood). Fourth,
one's belief may be justified to a greater or lesser degree (and one may distinguish between a belief's perceived
justification and a belief's actual justification). For more on such distinctions, seehere; for now,
I want to get across how I am using the word "belief": as tentative acceptance that a fact is so, or that a sentence or
proposition is true. And I especially want to note that I am not using the word "belief" to indicate irrationality,
lack of good reason, or the unshakability of certitude (absolute conviction). A belief may be held irrationally, or lacking
good reason, or with the unshakable certitude of absolute conviction, but I do not intend the word "belief" to imply such
features; I only intend it as tentative acceptance of a fact or of a proposition's truth. (The word "tentative," of course,
reflects the uncertainty of most beliefs; as stated, most belief is belief is likelihood.)
(© 2007 by Keith Brian Johnson)
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