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Why God's Foreknowledge Would Not Conflict with Freedom of the Will
Here, I gave the argument showing the apparent conflict between the
omniscience of a putative God and human freedom of the will, using a person X's choice between action A and action B
(or simply not-A) at time t, where such a God foreknows that person X will in fact perform action A at time t. Stripped
down to its bare essentials, the argument, assuming an omniscient God who infallibly foreknows all events in spacetime,
runs this way:
(1) God infallibly foreknows that person X will choose action A at time t.
(2) Person X cannot possibly defy God's infallible foreknowledge.
(3) Therefore, person X must choose action A at time t.
The argument deduces not only the inevitability of person X's choice but also the necessity of his choice
from God's infallible foreknowledge, and it certainly seems to show the incompatibility of God's foreknowledge
with human freedom of the will.
The reason I think that this argument does not, in fact, demonstrate a conflict between God's foreknowledge and human
freedom of the will is that I think that although it is a correct temporal analysis of what
happens, I don't think it is a correct logical analysis of what happens. I.e., God's foreknowledge (if it is true
foreknowledge) temporally precedes person X's choice of action A at time t, but person X's choice of action A
at time t nevertheless logically precedes God's foreknowledge of his choice. The logic of the situation is, I think,
as follows (again, in brief):
(1') Person X chooses (or will choose) action A at time t.
(2') God infallibly foreknows that which will actually happen..
(3') Therefore, God infallibly foreknows that person X chooses (or will choose) action A at time t.
It is not God's foreknowledge that brings about person X's choice of action; it is person X's choice of action that
brings about God's foreknowledge. We are not used to thinking of effects preceding causes, but, in effect, that is
what we have here. It is as though a psychic consistently predicted future events; would we say that he was causing
those events, or would we just say that he somehow foreknew them? Our mental model, I think, would be of events'
occurring in the future and of the psychic's somehow seeing them, as though he had a telescope into the future.
Similarly, God's foreknowing may be thought of that way: Events happen in the future, and God somehow sees them,
as though he had a telescope into the future. His seeing them doesn't make the events happen; his knowing them
doesn't compel them to happen. Rather, the events themselves make his foreknowledge what it is; the
occurrences themselves dictate what it is he sees. Person X acts in ignorance
of his future; he may evaluate apparent alternatives; but he's free to choose as he wishes. Once he chooses, then
God foreknows his choice--logically speaking, rather than temporally speaking--with a logical "then," rather than a
temporal "then."
The temptation of the argument lies in the seemingly undeniable fact that once one has granted God's foreknowledge,
person X really does have to choose as he does, since to grant God's foreknowledge is to grant that person X's choice
is "written in metaphysical stone" and is, therefore, unavoidable--it is inevitable. The problem is that one can't grant
God's foreknowledge before stipulating person X's choice of action or independently of stipulating person X's
choice of action. One must first stipulate person X's choice of action and only then grant God's
foreknowledge of it, since God's knowledge of a fact depends on the fact itself. The choice of action logically precedes
God's foreknowledge of it. Were person X to choose differently, God's foreknowledge would also be different, precisely
because person X had chosen differently.
(If you're having trouble seeing that, think of a choice a human being has made in the past. Because it's in the past, it's
"written in metaphysical stone"--it has happened as it has happened, and it cannot be changed [or so we normally
accept to be true about past events]. I already know that my nephew chose to watch the Phillies game yesterday; but
does my knowing mean that his choice wasn't free? No, of course not. And had he chosen differently, my knowledge
would be different. Similarly, God may already know that my nephew will watch the Phillies game tomorrow--but the
choice to do so may still be freely made. And were he to choose differently, God's foreknowledge would be different.
[To be fair, there is an asymmetry between the two cases. In one, I remember backward in time to see what has already
been done, and remembering backward in time isn't thought to have any effect on the freedom of my nephew's
decision-making process before the making of his choice; in the other, God remembers forward in time, so to speak,
and such remembering forward in time might be thought to have an effect on the freedom of my nephew's
decision-making process before the making of his choice. But I hope that the example makes it easier to imagine how
one's knowledge of a choice--in this case, God's foreknowledge--need not be thought of as removing freedom from that
choice.])
Similar considerations will arise in the analysis of fatalism, but with respect to the present truth of propositions
expressing the occurrence or nonoccurrence of future events rather than with respect to God's infallible
foreknowledge. In fact, the thesis that God's infallible foreknowledge conflicts with human freedom of the will is
sometimes called "theological fatalism." Both fatalism and theological fatalism put the cart before the horse and wind up
unjustifiably denying human freedom of the will. As seen above, there is no real conflict between a putative omniscient
God's infallible foreknowledge and human freedom of choice, because the choice logically precedes the foreknowledge.
(© by Keith Brian Johnson)
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