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Describing Reality: Holism and Nonholism
"I might see the spiderweb as a whole, but I also see its internal structure; and I see both features of the
spiderweb, its unbroken wholeness and its internal structure, simultaneously."
Some people think that the analytical, scientific approach to describing reality is mistaken, because it is not holistic.
An analytical, scientific approach breaks down reality into lots and lots of separate objects and examines their
interactions, and the holists--some of them, anyway--seem to think that this approach conflicts with the holistic one.
Since they think the holistic one is correct, or at least more natural, they also think the analytical, scientific one is
incorrect, or at least artificial.
But both the holistic approach and the analytical, scientific approach are simply descriptions. Neither description
is the one true description; each is simply a way of conceptualizing the universe. (In fact, in a way, thinking of the
analytical, scientific approach as nonholistic is actually a mistake; scientists do not think of the universe as composed of
lots of separate pieces that never interact, after all, but as composed of lots of separate pieces that are constantly
interacting. It's simply that their focus is usually on just a little bit of it at a time.) Neither description captures all of the
ways in which the universe is legitimately describable, but each description is nevertheless legitimate.
Imagine a spiderweb--one that has been spun perfectly and that has no breaks in it from wear and tear. Now imagine
that at various nodes (intersections of strands) there are captured bugs bundled up in webbing, ready to be eaten. Then
the various bundles are all connected by strands of web, and a complete description of the spiderweb will include a
notation of those connections. On the other hand, a complete description of the spiderweb will also include a notation of
those separate bundles. They are separate not because they are totally disconnected from each other--in fact, they're
not totally disconnected, since they are connected by strands of spiderweb--but because they occur at nodes of the web
and do not themselves continue uninterrupted as bundles along the strands. Sure, no bundle is isolated from the
rest of the web--there's no point at which a bundle comes to an end; no bundle is an entity floating in the air on its own,
disconnected from the rest of the web--but it doesn't take much arbitrariness to think of the bundle as distinct from every
other bundle in the web and as connected to those bundles by strands of spiderweb.
Now, one may choose to think of all of the bundles as inseparable, either in the sense that they are all interconnected or
in the sense that if you remove one, you'll have torn the spiderweb. But one may also choose to think of them as
separate objects--as separated objects--connected by strands of spiderweb. These are two different
descriptions of the spiderweb and its bundles. Is it an error to say that the spiderweb is an unbroken whole? Of
course not; the spiderweb is an unbroken whole. Is it an error to say that the spiderweb consists of bundles
connected to each other by strands of spiderweb? Of course not; the spiderweb isn't an undifferentiated whole,
after all--it does consist of
regions of greater density (the bundles) and regions of lesser density (the connecting strands)--it isn't internally uniform.
It does have internal structure. Are the two descriptions in conflict? Of course not. One may choose to
emphasize the unbroken wholeness of the spiderweb, in the spirit of the holist, or one may choose to emphasize its
internal structure, in the spirit of the analytical scientist. The holist isn't incorrect, as long as he doesn't deny the internal
structure of the spiderweb, and the analytical scientist isn't incorrect, as long as he doesn't deny the wholeness of the
spiderweb.
Similarly, one may think holistically of the entire universe, conceiving of it as a single entity, in that everything in it is
connected (if that's true) or
in that if you remove something from the universe you'll have created a "hole" in the universe; or one may think of it as a
four-dimensional whole (ignoring any extra dimensions the universe might have, like those of superstring
theory). Those are perfectly legitimate descriptions (or might be, anyway). But it's not an error to also think of
the universe as consisting of interconnected, interacting objects, or as bundles of fundamental matter particles connected
by the
exchange of fundamental force particles. One may choose to emphasize the unbroken wholeness of the universe, or one
may choose to emphasize the internal structure of the universe, and neither choice need be wrong. Moreover, the same
person may make both sorts of description. The holistic sort of description might appeal to one's mystical side, and the
scientific sort of description might appeal to one's analytical side, but neither, properly expressed, is an error. They're
just different descriptions.
Although the analytical, scientific description is certainly more useful in everyday life, the holistic point of view is
sometimes thought to be more natural. I don't really understand that claim. Maybe the claim is that an omniscient
entity would see the universe holistically. But it seems to me that if there were an omniscient entity, he'd see the universe
from all
perspectives simultaneously, whether holistic or analytical, so that neither sort of description would be preferred. I might
see the spiderweb as a whole, but I also see its internal structure; and I see both features of the spiderweb, its
unbroken wholeness and its internal structure, simultaneously. Surely any omniscient entity would do the same with the
universe.
(© 2007 by Keith Brian Johnson)
Rewritten from an essay first appearing on one of the Darwin Awards philosophy fora under the moniker "Nil
Desperandum"; the Darwin Awards philosophy fora may be found here.
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